The fifth EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007 did not only extend the Single European Market. Since 2009, the euro zone encompasses 16 out of 27 EU member states. Additionally the Schengen area has been expanded to include 25 European countries (22 EU member states). A first evaluation shows that the new member countries have already been able to benefit noticeably from their participation in the single market, despite not yet fully integrated labour markets. However, the international financial crisis also shadows onto the economies of the new member states. After an ex post evaluation the possible future integration effects of EU's 2007 enlargement by Bulgaria and Romania are simulated with a simple macro-economic integration model able to encompass as many of the theoretically predicted integration effects possible. The direct integration effects of Bulgaria and Romania spill-over to EU15, including Austria and the 10 new member states of the 2004 EU enlargement. The pattern of the integration effects is qualitatively similar to those of EU's 2004 enlargement by 10 new member states. Bulgaria and Romania gain much more from EU accession than the incumbents in the proportion of 20:1. In the medium-run up to 2020, Bulgaria and Romania can expect a sizable overall integration gain, amounting to an additional ½ percentage point real GDP growth per annum. Within the incumbent EU member states Austria will gain somewhat more (+0.05%) than the average of EU15 (+0.02%) and the 10 new EU member states (+0.01%), which joined the EU in 2004.
Introduction
EU enlargement is progressing. With the entry of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 the EU has completed its fifth enlargement which started in 2004 with the accession of ten new members.
The EU will enlarge further by absorbing the countries of the Western Balkans (starting with Croatia) and later may be also Turkey will become a member of the EU. EU27 with 492 million inhabitants is the largest regional economic integration area, forming a specific kind of a regional integration agreement (RIA) with maximal economic and institutional integration, ranging from a customs union to the single market and is extending step by step towards an economic and monetary union (EMU) with a single currency -the Euro.
The fifth EU enlargement was dominated by political motives, whereas the preceding enlargements served essentially economic interests to enlarge the single (or internal) market and to create a monetary unification with a single currency. The founding fathers of the European Integration process, however, wanted to create structures to secure sustainable political stability in Europe after the catastrophe of the Second World War. The reason why the fifth EU enlargement was such a grand project was the fact that with it -starting with the breakdown of communism in 1989 -the political separation of Europe was finally ended.
Whether this important step of European unification -a step of historic dimension -will pay off finally in economic terms cannot yet be answered definitively. Due to the large gaps in income levels between East and West this integration step will entail economic adjustments.
For many entrepreneurs -primarily in the old EU member states -the enlargement of the single market opened up great chances to expand their business. However, the advantages of free movement of capital and hence the great chances for foreign direct investments in the new "emerging markets" are contrasted by the disadvantages of the new member states resulting from the still transitionally closed labour markets for their work force in the majority of the old member states. and concrete integration steps which can be directly "felt" by the citizens and are positively associated with EU integration. This helps to improve the pro-EU mood of the population, which presently is not so good in many EU member states. The international financial crises which unfolded in earnest mid-year 2008 will lump the industrialized world into recession in 2009/2010. This will also have negative spill-overs to the new EU member states, although their performance is still better than in the old EU member states.
A first empirical evaluation of five years of an enlarged EU is made in the next chapter. In chapter 3 we develop a generalized unified theory which is able to capture most of the theoretical integration effects one expects from enlarging an existing Union. The hitherto and the expected integration effects in the future are then demonstrated in the case of Bulgaria's and Romania's EU integration. Chapter 5 presents the results of this integration models for Bulgaria and Romania as well as the spill-overs to Austria, EU15 and the new 10 EU member states (EU10N). Conclusions are drawn in chapter 6.
Experiences with EU's Fifth Enlargement in 2004 and 2007
The fifth EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007 did not only extend the Single European Market.
Since 2009, the euro zone encompasses 16 out of 27 EU member states. Additionally the Schengen area has been expanded to include 22 member states. The new member countries have already been able to benefit noticeably from their participation in the Single Market,
despite not yet fully integrated labour markets and a still not completed Single Market for Services (see Breuss et al., 2008) . The more the EU member states can trade with each other without trade barriers within the Single Market the more they are protected against the perils of globalization (see Breuss, 2008B) . Enlarging the Single Market therefore extends also this valuable shield. On the other hand one could argue that the bigger the share of intra-EU trade in total trade due to enlargement (presently, it amounts already to nearly 2/3 of total trade of EU member states) the less interested the EU might be in an early finalization of the Doha Round (see Breuss, 2008A) .
4
With the completion of its fifth enlargement in 2007 the EU increased the number of its members from 25 to 27. However, like in the preceding enlargement steps (1995 and 2004) only small countries entered the EU. In 2004 EU's population increased by 19%, in 2007 by only 6%, GDP (at PPS) increased by 9% and 2% respectively. Intra-EU trade increased by 11% and 1 1/2%, respectively. A first evaluation leads to the following conclusions (see Breuss, 2007C and Table 1 above):
• The majority of the new member states have grown faster in the period since 2004 than in the previous five years (see Table 1 ). Slovakia (+4.7%), Romania (+3.7%) and Czech Republic (+3%) as well as Poland (+2.4%) exhibited a higher average annual growth rate of real GDP than those of the 12 new member states (+2.1%). Bulgaria performed like the average. The others performed below the average of the 12 new member states. Hungary (-1.2%) was the only country with declining average growth rates and hence was the only loser of enlargement so far. 
+1.1%).
• The last EU enlargement, however, also contributed to a statistically "impoverishment" of the enlarged EU. As a consequence the average GDP per capita was reduced by nearly 11 percentage points. Insofar, the completion of one of the Lisbon targets -the closing of the income gap vis à vis the USA -is getting more difficult than before. After EU enlargement, the income gap vis à vis the USA has increased to 51 percentage points from 35 percentage points between USA and EU 15. We need a long period of catching-up in the new member states with permanently high growth rates in order to correct this deficiency.
• The other macro variables exhibited a mixed picture. The situation of the labour market has improved in most new member states, their unemployment rates decreased. Inflation could be largely subdued. With the exception of Hungary, the budgetary consolidation process succeeded in all new member states.
• The new EU member states expanded their trade with the old EU member states. More so trade was created between themselves. Also the old EU member states redirected their trade flows towards the new member states (intra EU trade creation), a process at the expense of intra-EU-15 trade (intra-EU trade diversion; see Table 2 ). • In spite of the brisk trade activities since 2004 it seems as if the old EU member states could exploit their comparative advantages much better than the new member states. This is reflected in the improvement of the trade and current account balances in trade with the new member states. Many new member states, however, in trade with the old member states generated high deficits in both balances, respectively. Relatively better performed only the more advanced five CEEC countries, primarily neighbours of Austria. Table 3 ). Those new member states which during its transitional period privatized early and to a high degree also attracted the biggest share of FDI inflows.
• They have to wait and try to comply with the Maastricht convergence criteria. In most of the new member states, partly their inflation rate (and/or the long-term interest rate) is too high, partly the budget deficit is not in conformity with the criteria. The latter is particularly true for Hungary (see Table 4 ).
A stylized generalized unified theory of EU enlargement
The theory of regional economic integration has to deal with geographically discriminatory trade policy issues and is regulated in different types of regional integration agreements (RIAs) 1 , ranging from free trade agreements (FTAs) to custom unions (CUs) and in the case 1 RIAs which are also called regional trade agreements (RTAs) or free trade areas (FTAs) are preferential agreements and in principle inconsistent with the GATT's most favored nations (MFN) principle. However, GATT Article XXIV specifically allows RIAs unless they violate certain conditions. Free trade areas (FTAs) -like the EFTA or NAFTA -or customs unions (CUs) -like the EU -are allowed under the GATT unless they fail to eliminate barriers on "substantially all the trade" among members and, additionally, that external tariffs "shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive" than prior to the formation of the FTA. Sluggish or no progress in the Doha Development Round has accelerated further the rush to forge RTAs. The total number of (at the WTO) notified preferential agreements in force is currently 170, while a further considerable number is under negotiations/proposal stage (see Crawford and Fiorentino, 2005, p. 1) . Pascal Lamy (see: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl53_e.htm), Director-General of the WTO forecasted recently that by 2010 around 400 of such agreements could be active, increasing the complicated web of incoherent rules, coined by Professor Bhagwati (1995) a "spaghetti bowl" of twisted rules of origin. Whereas the trade purists condemn bilateral "spaghetti bowls" as second or third best welfare solutions to liberalizing world trade, Baldwin (2006B) takes them as political facts and as "building blocs on the path to global free trade". Accordingly, moving to global free trade requires the political will of WTO member states to multilateralisation of regionalism. By 2010, Baldwin sees the world as three more or less perfectly formed trade blocs -one in Europe, one in North America and one in East Asia. However, the blocs might be fuzzy since the proliferation of FTAs makes it impossible to draw sharp lines around the big-3 trade blocks, and leaky since some FTAs create free trade "canals" linking the big 3 blocs. The EU can be taken as a good example how to tame the "spaghetti bowl syndrome". Firstly, by its continuing enlargements from originally six to 27 members it integrated most of the EFTA countries. Secondly, by pushing through the Pan-European Cumulation System (PECS) in 1997 (on the basis of the European Economic Area -EEA -agreement of 1994) it simplified the spaghetti muddle in Europe. With this the EU15, the EFTA4 (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland), and ten of the then applicant nations in Central Europe decided to amend their various FTAs by substituting a common set of rules of origin for those they originally contained. Value could thus be cumulated between different European countries without prejudicing the dutyfree status of end products. PECS was extended to Turkey (with which the EU forms a CU since 1996) in 1999. In 2005 the system has been enlarged to the Faroe Islands and the Mediterranean countries, and hence is commonly referred to as the Pan-Euro-Mediterranean cumulation system (PEMCS; for more details (general overview, legal framework, specific provisions) on the Pan-Euro-Mediterranean cumulation system, refer to the of the EU it is a Single Market ( Due to the complexity of EU's integration (enlargement in particular) one dreams of finding a "Grand Unified Theory" (GUT) like in theoretical physics. 2 In the case of regional economic integration, Baldwin and Venables (1995) recommended such a GUT for the case of a (fictitious) country entering a RIA and by Kohler (2004) for the case of an incumbent country (Germany) if the EU is enlarging. In chapter 2 we present a stylized GUT of EU's enlargement. Based on this insights we build a simple model of EU's fifth enlargement encompassing as many of the integration effects predicted by the GUT as possible.
In the following we study the welfare change in an open economy -in our case for a small country -joining the EU.
Following Venables (1995, p. 1691) 
SF
By totally differentiating and dividing through by the marginal utility of expenditure Venables (1995, p. 1601 and Appendix A) derive an equation (here slightly extended) of welfare change which can be interpreted as a stylized GUT for a new EU member state in the process of EU enlargement
A GUT of enlargement should be able to explain at least three major effects of regional integration: allocation of resources (static "trade effects", "scale effects"), accumulation or growth effects and location effects 4 inclusive factor movements. Equation (1) 
Euro's pro-trade effect:
The experience with the existing Euro area so far shows that the introduction of the Euro additionally reduces transaction costs and hence stimulates intraeuro-area trade in the range between 5% and 15% (with 9% the best estimate), depending on 13 the method of gravity model estimates (for a critical survey, see Baldwin, 2006A) . New research suggests, however, that reduced transaction costs were not primarily responsible for the pro-trade effect of the introduction of the Euro, arguing instead that it was caused by the export of new goods to Euro zone economies. The mechanism driving this is seen in a reduction in the fixed cost of introducing new goods into Euro zone markets (for such arguments, see Baldwin, 2006A, p. 87) . Applying the "Casella effect" (see footnote 6) to the introduction of the Euro one finds a small country bonus: on average the Euro has led to improvement of small Euro area countries relative export performance by 3 to 9 percent (see Badinger and Breuss, 2008B) . One can expect that the same mechanism will play a role when the new member states of EU's 2004 and 2007 enlargement will join the Euro zone (first estimates forecast an increase of 5% intra-euro-area trade in the new EU member states; see Belke and Spies, 2007) .
ii) "Scale effects": The three terms in the second row capture theoretical predictions of models with increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition. The first term is the "output" effect, arising if there is a change in output in industries where price differs from average cost. The second term is the "scale" effect, which gives the value of changes in average costs induced by changes in firm scale 6 . The third terms gives "variety" effects which may arise when the number of differentiated consumer products changes, like in trade models with Dixit-Stiglitz type utility functions and ingredients of the theory of monopolistic competition (see Grossman and Helpman, 1991) .
iii) "Accumulation effects": The term in the third row captures what is also called the "growth" effect of regional integration. It implies that a change in investment is instantaneously costly, but it also augments the capital stock with a social rate of return r .
Discounting this at a social discount rate ρ gives the present value ρ / r , and a change in investment has a first-order welfare effect if this ratio differs from one. 
Implementing the theoretical integration effects
On the basis of the stylized GUT of equation (1) we explain the integration effects considered in our simple model and the channels of interactions. However, contrary to the theoretical ambitions laid down in equation (1) Dimaranan, 2006) with 12 countries/regions, 3 sectors and 5 factors of productions using the data base 2001 (see Table 5 ). The Ad ii) "Scale and imperfect competition effects": As we deal only with a simple aggregate or macro model for BG and RO we capture only one effect of imperfect competition of the second row of equation (1). We model mark-up pricing in our price equation (P). We assume that after participating in EU's single market price competition increases and hence, reduces the market power of incumbent firms in BG and RO. This pricing behaviour can be detected empirically in the old EU member states after creating the single market in 1993 (see Badinger, 2007) .
This reduces the mark-up on unit labour costs and hence dampens inflation.
Ad iii and iv) "Accumulation effects":
Only one accumulation or growth effect via the capital augmenting effect of real gross fixed investment is predicted theoretically in the third row of equation (1) . However, the equation does not explain how investments are induced. In our investment equation (I) we explicitly try to explain changes in investment by FDI inflows (FDI) and by transfers out of the EU budget (here we use only the structural funds transfers in percent of GDP -the variable COH) for improving the infrastructure. Via the GDP equation additional investments stimulate real GDP. With this modelling approach we combine the effects of the third and fourth row of equation (1). Besides the growth enhancing effect of trade opening (X+M) we also consider the positive link of changes of research and development for GDP growth. Hence, we consider the primary message of the new endogenous growth theory of trade (see e.g. Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991) .
Changes in the share of research and development in GDP (R&D) stimulate productivity and via the GDP equation also GDP growth.
From the hitherto existing practical experience with the single market program we know that newcomers in the single market experienced a striking productivity shock in the first 18 adjustment phase. We implement such a transitional shock exogenously into our productivity equation (PR) by adjusting the residual accordingly (see Table 6 ).
Ad v) "Location or globalisation effects": Integration of unevenly developed economies
induce stark factor movements which may dominate trade effects. In the case of EU enlargement one can speak of a "mini-globalisation" as a subset of the world-wide globalisation.
(1) "Migration effects": According to Borjas (1995) migration of labour may lead to an "immigration surplus" -i.e. a welfare gain -in the recipient country and -as a mirror imageone must conclude that it leads to a "migration loss" or welfare loss in the country from which labour emigrates. We model these effects in the equation for employment (E) and in those for the unemployment rate (U) in a reduced form. In both cases changes in the labour force via Bank (OeNB) show that the return on equity (RoE) of FDIs in Eastern Europe increased much faster and they are higher than those achieved in the old EU countries since 1989 (see Altzinger, 2006; Fuchs, 2006) . FDI inflows in BG and RO help to improve investment (see our investment equation I) and hence stimulate GDP growth. The FDI net outflows of the EU15 and that of AT are modelled explicitly as determined by the weighted GDP growth in the partner countries of the enlarged EU.
Ad vi) "Euro participation effects":
The stylized GUT of enlargement is not able to capture the more complex effects involved if an EU member participates in the EMU. As we discussed earlier, however, we can -due to reduced transaction costs -expect similar protrade effects in the new EU member states when introducing the Euro. In order to take account of the possible macro-economic effects of the Euro zone participation we estimated a
Taylor rule for BG and RO explaining the setting of the short-term interest rates (RS). In case of a future Euro zone participation -which requires to fulfilment of the Maastricht Neck and Weyerstrass, 2007) . 
Models for Bulgaria and

Models for EU15, EU10N and Austria:
According to our philosophy we consider the integration effects in the old EU member states only as derived ones. The trade relations of EU15 with BG (0.2% of total exports) and RO (0.6%) and those of the EU10N (0.4% and 1.6% respectively) and even those of AT (0.5% and 1.5% respectively) are too small as one could expect a considerable direct integration impact in the old EU member states. Therefore we model only spill-overs from BG and RO to the old EU member states via GDP equations with weighted GDP growth's of BG and RO as explanatory variables.
As already mentioned, we also model net FDI outflows (FDINET) from the EU15 and from AT as determined by GDP growth in the partner countries, and hence also in BG and RO. In the case of Austria we also explain the declining wage share (functional income distribution - 
Model inputs
The integration effects in BG and RO are simulated by considering 7 scenarios (see Table 6 ).
We have to differentiate between a pre-accession phase and the EU membership phase proper.
The integration process into the EU starts with a pre-accession phase in which the candidate countries are supported with several financial aids (ISPA, SAPARD etc.) out of the EU budget. Trade integration already takes place before becoming an EU member. Trade between the old EU and the CEECs was already liberalized via the EAs in an asymmetric manner.
Tariffs on EU's imports from BG and RO were abolished already in 1997, while the tariffs on imports from the EU in the latter countries were eliminated in 2002. Being an EU candidate country makes these economies attractive and secure for FDIs. With EU accession the new members are participating in the CU of the EU implying an adjustment of their national tariffs to EU's Common External Tariff (CET). Model inputs refer to an integration scenario in comparison with a baseline scenario without EU integration; for the detailed model inputs, see Appendix B.
Prior to EU accession the import tariffs in RO (19%) were higher than in BG (12%), whereas EU's CET was around 6%. Also the tariffs for agricultural products were much higher in both countries than in the EU. Besides becoming a member of the CU of the EU the newcomers enter the single market what implies a productivity shock and more competition and, therefore, a dampening effect on prices. The new member states have better access to the research framework programs of the EU and -because they are poor countries -are eligible to receive structural funds transfers out of the EU budget.
The exact quantitative inputs used in the simulations of the 7 integration scenarios are collected in Appendix B. In some cases the inputs are the same in both countries, in others we differentiate between BG and RO. Ex ante, one never knows the intensity of the adjustments 22 shocks (e.g. in labour productivity) and one can only speculate about the length or the timing of the shocks. In principle, the quantification of our inputs are calibrated according to past experiences with the enlargement of EU's single market.
Integration effects of EU's 2007 Enlargement
Ahead of EU's fifth enlargement in 2004 a vast variety of studies were undertaken with the whole range of models available -multi-and single countries CGE models or world and single countries macro models. The great attraction to carry out such studies was founded in the novelty of the problem. Past EU enlargements primarily dealt with the integration of industrial countries with comparable levels of development (also Greece, Portugal and Spain lagged somewhat behind the old EU member states). The eastern enlargement of the EU posed several challenges. The formerly communist and planned economies firstly had to qualify as an EU candidate country according to the Copenhagen criteria (the countries had to transform to democracies, market economies and they had to adjust their legal system to EU's acquis communautaire). Secondly, after the systemic transformation these countries had to 
Bulgaria and Romania
For the new EU member states we fully modelled the expected integration effects of entering EU's single market. The macro-economic effects for some major variables are shown in Table   7 . The overall results (all 7 scenarios combined) exhibit the following features:
1) Due to our input calibration the overall effects in both countries are quite similar.
2) The integration effects started already in the pre-accession period. Preparation for accession resulted already in a higher average annual growth of real GDP of 0.3% in BG and 0.2% in RO.
3) The integration effects started to accelerate with joining the EU in 2007. Calculated until 2020 we expect an average annual growth effect of real GDP of 0.6% in both countries. Real only short-lived. EU integration means a temporary shock to the level of GDP, which translates in a jump in GDP growth rates but does not lead to a permanent steady-state increase of growth. This pattern is replicated here in the case of BG and RO in Figure 1 . Scenarios: 1 = trade effects, 2 = investment effect of FDI, 3 = investment effect of structural funds, 4 = productivity effect of R&D, 5 = Mark-up pricing; 6 = exogenous productivity adjustment shock, 7 = migration effect. Scenarios: 1 = trade effects, 2 = investment effect of FDI, 3 = investment effect of structural funds, 4 = productivity effect of R&D, 5 = Mark-up pricing; 6 = exogenous productivity adjustment shock, 7 = migration effect.
2) The biggest isolated GDP growth shock stems from the exogenously implemented productivity shock (scenario 6). As we do not know ex ante how strong this shock might be and how long it will last, we calibrated it as such that it is somehow similar in both countries, with a slightly stronger impact in RO because the productivity performance was weaker than in BG ahead of EU accession. Anyway, we distributed the shock only over the period 2007 to 2010 and made sure that it dies away later on. Of course, in the case of the PR shock one 27 could also consider more or less impact on the economies. Here, we inputted only modest shocks.
3) The trade induced GDP growth effect (via more stimulated productivity growth) peters out relatively fast after EU accession.
4) The mark-up pricing behaviour has no impact on GDP.
5) Migration exerts -as expected -a negative effect on GDP ("migration loss"), starting with 2014 when the EU opens its labour markets completely. The simulation exercise of scenario 7 is only a tentative one, maybe considering a too strong migration effect when assuming that 1% of the labour force in both countries could emigrate in each year, starting in 2014. Figure 2 shows the resulting long-run cumulative level effects of GDP for the 7 integration scenarios in both countries. Again, the assumed exogenous productivity effect is the strongest single integration effect.
Spill-overs to Austria, EU15 and EU10N
As mentioned earlier the old EU member states are affected by the accession of BG and RO only on a indirect way via trade spill-overs and factor movements (FDI outflows and labour immigration). The results, collected in Table 8 , exhibit the following features: 1) Austria, which on average trades more with BG and RO than the EU15 and EU10N can also expect somewhat higher GDP gains: 0.03% additional annual GDP growth in the period 2007-2020, compared to 0.01% in EU15 and EU10N, respectively.
2) Derived from the slightly positive GDP effects we also get the expected improvement in the labour market and more net FDI outflows.
3) The further process of EU's "mini-globalisation" by an ongoing enlargement towards ever poorer countries implies a further (slight) deterioration of Austria's income distribution, i.e. a shrinking wage share. As already mentioned before, we cannot expect a permanent increase of steady-state GDP growth. Instead, we foresee a temporary jump in GDP growth rates in BG and RO and consequently also in a much alleviated manner in AT, EU15 and EU10N (see Figure 3 ). Finally, we show the results of the assumed migration in 2014 (scenario 7) in Figure 6 . As expected, we replicate the "immigration surplus" in AT, EU15 and EU10N and the "migration loss" in BG and RO 11 . Although, for only demonstrative purposes we assumed that starting in 2014 1% of the labour force of BG and RO will leave their countries and migrate to AT, EU15 or EU10N, the GDP effects are small: -0.07% real GDP p.a. in BG and -0.05% in RO;
+0.03% in AT and practically zero in EU15 and EU10N.
11 In a study on the economic impact of migration flows following the 2004 enlargement process D'Auria et al.
(2008) achieve similar results: those countries which opened their labour markets right from the beginning (like Ireland, the UK and Sweden) gained the most measured in cumulative real GDP over the period [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . The sender countries (primarily Poland), in contrast, lost real GDP. In the first four years of enlargement roughly 1 million citizens moved from the 10 new member states to the 15 old member states. The UK received 532.000 persons, Ireland 162.000, Germany 96.000, Spain 67.000, Italy 32.000 and Austria 26.000. In Ireland the cumulative real GDP increase (+4.2%) was highest, followed by UK (+1%) and Austria (+0.4%). In the other old member states the "immigration surplus" amounted to around +0.1% or less. In the sender countries the largest GDP loss was exhibited in Latvia (-3.5%), Lithuania (-4.7%) and Poland and Slovakia (each -2.1%). In the remaining new member states the "migration loss" was less pronounced (see D'Auria et al., 2008, p.18) .
Conclusions
A first evaluation of the grand fifth EU enlargement lead to the following basic findings:
• In most of the new member states the economy grew faster since 2004 or 2007 than before.
• The recent enlargement resulted statistically in an "impoverishment" of the enlarged EU,
i.e. the average GDP per capita decreased.
• The new member states increased trade with the old member states, but more so trade was created within each other. Also the EU 15 countries redirected their trade flows towards the new member states at the cost of reducing intra-EU trade.
• Instead of busy trade activities since 2004 the old EU member states could exploit much better their comparative advantages than the new member states theirs. This is reflected in a continuous improvement of the trade and current account balances in trade of the old EU member states in trade with the new ones. As a mirror image the current account balances of the new member states in trade with the old ones deteriorated.
• With the exception of Slovenia (2007) • The evaluation of the integration effects (in the past and in the long-run future) of Bulgaria and Romania with a simple macro-economic integration model trying to encompass as many of the theoretically predicted integration effects possible leads to the following results:
Bulgaria and Romania gain much more from EU accession than the incumbents by the proportion of 20:1. In the time up to 2020, Bulgaria and Romania can expect a considerable overall integration gain, amounting to additionally ½ percentage point more real GDP growth per annum. The incumbent EU member states will profit only slightly from this last step of EU enlargement. Due to more intensive trade relations, Austria will gain somewhat more (+0.05%) than the average of EU15 (+0.02%) and the 10 new EU member states (+0.01%) which joined the EU in 2004.
• The prototype model presented and applied here for Bulgaria and Romania may in principle also be applicable in the case of further EU enlargements toward the countries of the Western Balkan (e.g. Croatia) and Turkey. 
